Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially symmetric sentence (e.g., ''John exchanged products with Susan''). The results revealed a tendency to treat the grammatical subject as acting more intentionally than the grammatical object. In Experiment 3 participants were encouraged to think about the events that such sentences typically refer to, and the tendency was significantly reduced. These results suggest a privileged relationship between language and central theory-of-mind concepts. More specifically, there may be two ways of determining intentionality judgments: (1) an automatic verbal bias to treat grammatical subjects (but not objects) as intentional (2) a deeper, more careful consideration of the events typically described by a sentence.
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Introduction
Certain aspects of theory-of-mind appear to be automatic. For example, on the basis of visual cues alone, people spontaneously ascribe certain mental states to actors that may conflict with the judgments they make after careful reflection (e.g. Gao, McCarthy, & Scholl, 2010; Heider & Simmel, 1944) . Such automatic processes may arise from ''core knowledge'' structures often studied by infancy researchers (Spelke, 2000; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) and are seen as continuing to operate automatically into adulthood (Cheries, Mitroff, Wynn, & Scholl, 2009; Flombaum & Scholl, 2006) . Due to their illusory nature, these attributions can be quite different from the judgments people make after taking the time to think more deeply about a situation.
Here we ask whether linguistic cues might also trigger the immediate impression of intentionality in a way similar to visual cues. In particular, the current studies suggest a connection between the grammatical subject position and a representation of intentional action. This link creates a bias for stronger intentionality attribution to grammatical subjects than to non-subjects (e.g. indirect objects and direct objects).
Automaticity in theory-of-mind
Consider the disposition to attribute intentions to creatures and people in the world around us. All available evidence suggests that this is an early emerging and fundamental part of cognition. At 10 months of age, infants http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.05.021 0010-0277/Ó 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
